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TRANSPORTATION
OVERVIEW

During the survey period,' four opinions by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals highlight the power wielded by government agencies
in transportation law - from controlling motor carrier routes to shielding the government and private parties from tort liability. 2 First, in Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co.,3 the Tenth Circuit ruled a venture, which moved
and stored grain by rail, was not a common carrier, thus frustrating
plaintiff's attempt to bring suit under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA).4 In another case, Redmon v. United States,5 the Tenth Circuit
deferred to an agency safety inspector's discretionary decision to grant a
pilot license, which may have resulted in a fatal plane crash, thus shield6
ing the FAA from liability under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA).
In a third case, State Corp. Commission of Kansas v. Interstate Commerce Commission,7 the Tenth Circuit deferred to the Interstate Commerce Commission's decision, thus overriding an earlier state agency's refusal to
allow Greyhound Bus Carrier to drop three existing routes which were
necessary due to public need. Finally, in a fourth case, PilotsAgainst Illegal Dues (PAID) v. Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) 8, the Tenth Circuit
held an airline union appropriately charged nonunion members negotiating and administrative expenses incurred outside of the bargaining
unit. All four reported cases demonstrate the substantial judicial deference given agency interpretations of statutes and discretionary functions, often over legitimate state concerns. In transportation law, the
Tenth Circuit highly regards the expertise of the agencies and thus,
rarely overturns their decisions.
I.

SULLIVAN V. SCOULAR GRAIN Co. OF UTAH

9

A. Facts
Defendant, Scoular Grain Company of Utah (Scoular Venture) is a
joint venture formed by agreement between Freeport Center Associates
(Freeport), a commercial warehouse lessor, and Scoular Grain Company
(Scoular Grain), which unloads and stores grain adjacent to railroad
1. The cases surveyed include all Tenth Circuit cases decided in 1991 that relate to
transportation.
2. In a fifth case, Polys v. Trans-Colorado Airlines, Inc., 941 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir.
1991), the issue on appeal was procedural, and thus beyond the scope of this article.
3. 930 F.2d 798 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
5. 934 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1991).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
7. 933 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1991).
8. 938 F.2d 1123 (10th Cir. 1991).
9. 930 F.2d 798 (10th Cir. 1991).
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tracks owned and maintained by several commercial railroads.' 0 The
joint venture agreement provided that each venturer participate in the
control and management of the venture. Further, profits and losses are
shared according to an agreed formula."
While unloading grain, plaintiff Sullivan was severely injured, resulting in the amputation of his left arm and left leg. Scoular Venture
paid Sullivan $200,000 in workman's compensation for these injuries,
but Sullivan sought court awarded damages and filed suit against Scoular Venture, Scoular Grain, Freeport, and several other parties, under
FELA.12 FELA establishes a cause of action against a "common carrier
by railroad" for "any person suffering injury" while employed by the
carrier.' 3 The lower court granted summary judgment for the defend4
ants on this issue and Sullivan appealed.'
B.

Tenth Circuit Decision

The Tenth Circuit ruled Scoular Venture was not a common carrier
under FELA. Sullivan based his argument on the four-part test set forth
by the Fifth Circuit in Lone Star Steel Co. v. McGee. 1 5 Sullivan contended
there was a genuine issue of material fact remaining as to whether Scoular Venture was a common carer.
Although other circuits adopted the Lone Star test, 16 the Tenth Circuit held that the test merely provides a list of factors for courts to keep
consider when deciding whether a carrier is a "common carrier."' 7 The
Tenth Circuit instead followed the self-defining test of the Supreme
Court established in Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor,' 8 which defines a common carrier as one who operates a railroad as a means of carrying for
the public - that is to say a railroad company acting as a common carrier. 19 The Tenth Circuit also followed a later Supreme Court case,
which clarifies the self-defining test by stressing the requirement that an
entity subject to FELA liability must operate a "going railroad."' 20 Consequently, Scoular Venture, which owned or leased miles of railroad
track, hundreds of railroad cars and several switch engines, was primar10.

Id.

Id.
12. Id.
13. FELA establishes a cause of action against a "common carrier by railroad" for an
injury wholly or partly due to the carrier's negligence, while the individual was employed
by the carrier. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
14. Sullivan, 930 F.2d at 800-01.
15. 380 F.2d 640, 647 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). The four-part test
requires that to be a common carrier, the service be (1) actual performance of rail service;
(2) part of total service contracted for by a public member-, (3) performed as part of a
system of interstate rail transport with common ownership between itself and a railroad or
contract with railroads holding itself out to the public; and (4) remuneration for services is
received.
16. See, e.g., Aho v. Erie Mining Co., 466 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1972); Pickney v. Oro Dam
Constructors, 441 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1971).
17. Sullivan, 930 F.2d at 801.
18. 254 U.S. 175 (1920).
19. Id. at 187.
20. Edwards v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 390 U.S. 538, 540 (1968).
11.
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ily a grain storage venture. Thus, Scoular Venture was not considered a
21
common carrier under FELA because they were not a going railroad.
The Scoular decision rests solely on the Tenth Circuit court's primary
characterization of the company in determining whether it is a common
carrier. Although the challenging plaintiff is left with little guidance as
to how the Tenth Circuit will characterize a company, the court is standing by its test. For example, in a recent unreported case, a steel company, which maintained an in-plant rail system and shipped goods via a
"short haul" common carrier owned by the same holding company, was
not classified as a common carrier 2 2 and there was no liability under
FELA. The district court, relying on the Lone Star test, granted summary
judgement in favor of Sheffield Steel Company. The court stressed that
Wells Fargo and Pacific Fruit provide the relevant test, not Lone Star, yet
the decision was affirmed on appeal. The result is that Tenth Circuit
plaintiffs will not collect damages under FELA from a company not defined as an interstate railroad company.
II.
A.

2

REDMON v. UNITED STATES 3

Facts

Relatives of a pilot killed in a crash brought a wrongful death action
against the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Dr. Charles Ewing,
along with his wife and other passengers, was killed while he attempted
to navigate a twin engine Piper Seneca II through a severe thunderstorm
over the Ogden, Utah area. 24 Ewing was licensed by the FAA to operate
a multi-engine airplane with passengers over land in instrument flight
rules (IFR) conditions. 25 Such conditions exist when the pilot cannot
successfully operate the airplane visually under normal visual flight rules
(VFR) and must rely solely on the flight instrument panel.
One FAA flight inspector restricted Ewing to a VFR-only multiengine license and required Ewing to pass an IFR flight test for multiengined aircraft. 26 Ewing did not pass this test. 2 7 Later, another FAA
inspector granted Ewing his IFR status upon discovering Ewing had
been IFR rated for single engine planes because Ewing was within an
FAA grace period permitting pilots to transfer their IFR rating when
commencing multiengine training. Instead of requiring passing an IFR
flight test, the inspector removed the VFR-only restriction. 28
Ewing's relatives, based on the grace period rule, challenged the
removal of the VFR-only restriction by the FAA inspector claiming negligence by the inspector proximately caused the crash. Additionally,
21. Sullivan, 930 F.2d at 800-01.
22. Keizor v. Sheffield Steel Co., No. 91-5043, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 240, *8 (N.D.
Okla.Jan. 6, 1992).
23. 934 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1991).
24. Id at 1152-53.
25. Id. at 1152.
26. Id. at 1153.

27. Id.
28. Id.
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they claimed the inspector's failure to initiate an enforcement action
against Ewing proximately caused the crash.
B.

Tenth Circuit Decision

The Tenth Circuit determined the FAA's decision to permit pilots
rated IFR for single engine crafts to carry over their ratings to multiengined planes fell within the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA.2 9 The inspector's decision not to investigate and take enforcement action against Ewing fell within the discretionary function exception. 30 The Tenth Circuit noted that the aircraft certification process is
inherently discretionary. In making its determination, the court quoted
United States v. Varig Airlines3 1 and reaffirmed the broad scope of the discretionary function exception. 32 Similarly, the inspector's decision not
to investigate was consistent with the Federal Aviation Act 33 and properly claimed as a discretionary function. The court emphasized that the
discretionary function exception applies regardless of whether the
agency has abused its discretion. 3 4 In Redmon, the Tenth Circuit continued its tendency to broadly use the discretionary function exception to
bar tort actions against the FAA and other government entities,3 5 allowing FTCA tort actions only when purely operational functions are
36
involved.
III.

STATE CORP. COMMISSION V. INTERSTATE COMMERCE
3 7

COMMISSION

A.

Facts

Greyhound Bus Carrier applied to the Kansas Commerce Commission (KCC) for permission to abandon three existing routes. The KCC
denied the application because it was inconsistent with the public inter29. Id. at 1155-56 (citing United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 820 (1984).
(agency employees following agency directives are shielded from tort liability if agency
directives stem from discretionary function)).
30. Id. at 1157.
31. Id. at 1154 (quoting Varig, 467 U.S. at 819).
32. Redmon, 934 F.2d at 1154 n.1.
33. "The Secretary of Transportation may, from time to time .... re-examine any civil
airman." 49 U.S.C. App § 1429(a) See also 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.3 & 13.5 (1989) (investigations
by the FAA are discretionary in nature).
34. Redmon, 834 F.2d at 1157.
35. See Weiss v. United States, 889 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989) (Forest Service's decision to adopt an FAA provision regarding removal of obstructive objects was an exercise
of discretionary regulatory authority); Wendler v. United States, 782 F.2d 853 (10th Cir.
1985) (FAA's decision to suspend an aerial crop duster's commercial pilot certificate was a
discretionary function); Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 724 F.2d 871
(10th Cir. 1984) (trial court correctly applied the discretionary function exception despite
negligent designing and maintaining of the Denver Traffic Control Area which was the
proximate cause of a mid-air collision).
36. See United States v. Murray, 463 F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1972) (FTCA tort action
allowed because the flight runway operator's duty to hear airplanes and light the runway
was an operational, not discretionary, function).
37. 933 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1991).
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est.38 After a full KCC investigation and four public hearings, the KCC
determined that any benefit to Greyhound from abandoning the routes
was outweighed by financial impairments suffered by communities along
the routes.3 9 Subsequently, Greyhound applied to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) under the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982
(Bus Act),40 which gives the federal agency power to override a state's
rejection of a carrier request. The ICC granted Greyhound's request
because KCC failed to meet its burden of showing that suspension of the
three routes was either inconsistent with the public interest or was an
unreasonable burden on commerce. 4 1 In making this determination,
the ICC accorded great weight to Greyhound's contention that current
passenger revenues were less than the state's cost of providing
42
transportation.
B.

Tenth Circuit Decision

The Tenth Circuit reviewed the history of the Bus Act, noting that
ICC supremacy controls the ensuing conflicts when the state agency and
ICC differ about route discontinuance. 43 Next, the court reviewed the
ICC's criteria for deciding whether discontinuance is inconsistent with
the public interest. 44 In determining the relation of revenues to variable
costs for the routes under consideration, the ICC accepted Greyhound's
approach of calculating variable costs by multiplying its system-wide
per-mile variable cost by the number of miles traveled annually. 4 5 The
KCC objected to this method of calculation and proposed instead that
Greyhound's data should be adjusted to include "off-route revenues"
generated by passengers entering and leaving the routes.46 The KCC
also claimed the ICC misapplied a standard of the Bus Act, which requires the ICC consider the availability of reasonable alternative
47
transportation.
The Tenth Circuit concluded the ICC's findings were not arbitrary
and capricious or an abuse of discretion. 4 8 First, the court recognized
and deferred to the ICC's expertise. 4 9 Next, it noted the ICC did not
accept Greyhound's data without an appreciation of the underlying
methodology. 50 The court also noted the ICC's observation that it must
consider the policy of the Bus Act which favors exit from unprofitable
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 828-29.
Id. at 829.
49 U.S.C. § 10935(a) (1988).
State Corp. Comm'n, 933 F.2d at 830.
Id. at 829. The Bus Act requires a revenue/cost analysis. 49 U.S.C. § 10935(g)(1)

(1988).
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See State Corp. Comm'., 933 F.2d at 828.
Id. at 828-29.
Id. at 830.
Id.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 833.
Id. at 832.
Id.
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routes.
This Tenth Circuit decision reveals how federal agency deregulation has negatively impacted the state's public interest. The KCC had
made an informed and thorough investigation to determine that removal of these bus routes would result in several communities lacking
alternative transportation, but this was insignificant when compared to a
federal agency mandate to drop unprofitable routes. In overruling the
KCC, the ICC cited as determining factors (1) no funding by the state to
Greyhound, and (2) significant loss on each route canceled. Unless the
state will subsidize routes that the carrier and the ICC deem unprofitable, the state citizens will be left without service. Although the ICC
stated that a KCC subsidy offer might mitigate the unprofitability of the
routes, 5 2 the standard for balancing the public need or public impact
was left undefined. Under State Corp. Commission, deciding the public interest requirement of a transportation route is an agency discretionary
function leaving states nearly powerless to enforce public policy
considerations.
IV.
A.

PILOTS AGAINST ILLEGAL DuEs (PAID)
53
ASSOCIATION (ALPA)

v. AIR

LINE PILOTS

Facts

In the last case reviewed, a labor dispute, involved pilots of United
Airlines (PAID) who do not belong to Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA), the exclusive bargaining representative for all United Air Line
pilots. PAID are required to either join ALPA or pay for expenses incurred in representing the pilots because ALPA and United entered into
an agency shop arrangement. 54 PAID alleged ALPA violated both the
Railway Labor Act and their constitutional rights by using the agency
fees for purposes not akin to collective bargaining. 5 5 PAID also alleged
ALPA impermissably charged nonunion pilots for expenses incurred in
56
activities at other airlines.
The district court held that ALPA may use fees for expenses at
other airlines outside the immediate bargaining unit. 57 ALPA may divide litigation costs among all constituents, not just the pilot's own airline, because successful collective bargaining at one airline effects other
airlines. 58
51. Id. at 833. See also Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n v. United States, 749 F.2d
841 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that when costs exceed revenues, the Bus Act creates a presumption in favor of discontinuing the route).
52. Id. at 830.
53. 938 F.2d 1123 (10th Cir. 1991).
54. Id. at 1125.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 1128.
58. Id. at 1128 & 1128 n.3.
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Tenth Circuit Decision

The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding
that fees can be used for appropriate expenses outside the immediate
bargaining unit, but not for litigation expenses involving airlines other
than United. 59 The court held that under Lehnert v. FerrisFaculty Association 60 chargeable activities must be germane to collective bargaining.
The court further held ALPA properly charged PAID members for negotiating and administrative expenses incurred outside United's bargaining unit. ALPA reasonably divided negotiation costs among all
employees, because negotiation with one airline had positive effects
upon the other airlines.
CONCLUSION

The Tenth Circuit deference to agency authority and statutory interpretation is a common thread through all the transportation cases
surveyed. Although the judiciary played a significant role in determining what constituted a common carrier under both the Bus Act in State
Corp. Commission and FELA in Sullivan, the Tenth Circuit demonstrated
its deference to agency discretion and expertise in Redmon and State Corp.
Commission. For example, in Redmon, the government was found exempt
from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act when the agency exercised a discretionary function. Furthermore, the court noted that the
discretionary function, especially prevalent in FAA licensing, 6 1 applies
62
whether or not the discretion involved is abused.
Nevertheless, in State Corp. Commission, the Tenth Circuit deference
to a federal agency can override even a state agency's determination of a
public policy consideration under the Bus Act. Finally, in PAID,judicial
deference to the Railway Labor Act defeated attempts by individual pilots to recover dues spent outside of their interest.
CraigNegler

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 1134.
111 S.Ct. 1950 (1991).
Redmon, 834 F.2d 1151 at 1154 (citing Varig, 467 U.S. 797).
Id. at 1157. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).

